The intelligence community faces major challenges, including a widespread lack of confidence in its ability to carry out its mission competently and legally. One consequence of this perception is that reform of intelligence policy and capabilities will not be left up to the intelligence community itself. Other parts of the executive branch and Congress will certainly be involved. It is no less true, however, that the intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed demands of the post-Cold War world for several years and, for the most part, appears to be providing reliable and useful information to its customers. Additional reform is necessary, but should not create more problems than it solves and, in so doing, weaken a critical tool of US national security.
The need for intelligence and for a capability within the US government to collect, produce, and disseminate it remains critical. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an age of peace and security. Nor is the need for intelligence eliminated by new sources of open information. There are still important but hard to learn facts about targets-including the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorists, the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and the disposition of potentially hostile military forces-that can only be identified, monitored, and measured through dedicated intelligence assets.
The ultimate purpose of US intelligence is to enhance US national security by informing policymakers and supporting military operations. Toward these ends, one of the most important functions of the intelligence community is to provide analysis gleaned from all sources (open and secret) and to package it in a timely and useful manner. Only the intelligence community performs this essential integrative function. Add to the list law enforcement agencies, who need quality intelligence in order to deploy resources.
A large budgetary"peace dividend" in the intelligence area is unlikely. Although there should be opportunities for savings-reducing redundancies within and between agencies, introducing efficiencies, restraining over-tasking, devoting less effort to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe-modern systems for collection remain expensive. Moreover, the need to collect and assess information for a wide array of tasks is not fading. Accurate intelligence significantly enhances the effectiveness of diplomatic and military undertakings; while good intelligence cannot guarantee good policy, poor intelligence frequently contributes to policy failure. The United States will have to continue to devote significant resources if it desires a significant capability.
Last, it is important to keep in mind that no amount of redesign or regulation can compensate for poor leadership. It will fall upon current and future senior officials of the intelligence community to make the development of management skills a priority and promote a culture in which excellence is rewarded, talent is developed, quality is valued, legitimate risk-taking is encouraged, and respect for the law is unquestioned. Those entrusted with oversight are responsible for fostering such an environment. The new DCI, Porter Goss, is in the media spotlight because of his alleged "heavy-handed style" which led to the resignations of key CIA executives. Those involved in the war on terrorism, however, claim Director Goss is simply involved in purging the CIA of a political agenda which led to inactivity and incredible leaking of confidential information to members of the news media.
PRIORITIZING INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND ANALYSIS
The process by which intelligence requirements and priorities are established warrants overhaul. Requirements for both collection and analysis should be heavily influenced by the needs of policymakers, an imperative that argues against suggestions to isolate the collection agencies further or increase their autonomy. At the same time, some sort of market constraint, under which intelligence consumers can only receive so much free intelligence before their own agency has to find resources to support a greater intelligence effort, should be introduced.
Prioritization is a must. The highest priorities for US intelligence collection-and, in most cases, analysis-for the foreseeable future include the following: the status of nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union; developments in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; potential terrorism against US targets in the continental United States and overseas; unconventional weapons proliferation; and political and military developments in China. Other targets could be added to this list temporarily if , for example, US forces were to be deployed in significant numbers.
There is also a need for economic intelligence, although many could not agree on how aggressively the United States should collect information on its major economic partners or on how much to emphasize analysis of economic issues. There is agreement that economic intelligence should not be used offensively to help a US firm win a contract against foreign competition, but should be used defensively to alert policymakers when bribes or other unfair practices are being used against an American f irm. Counterintelligence was deemed appropriate to help protect US firms from the espionage efforts of foreign firms and governments.
The need to insulate intelligence from political pressure is a powerful argument for maintaining a strong, centralized capability and not leaving intelligence bearing on national concern up to individual policymaking departments. Competitive analysis of controversial questions can also help guard against politicization, as can Congress and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Competitive or redundant analysis needs to be carried out and conveyed to policymakers in those areas where being wrong can have major consequences. The leaders of the intelligence community must reinforce the ethic that speaking the truth to those in power is required-and defend anyone who comes under criticism for so doing.
The best way to ensure high-quality analysis is to bring high quality analysts into the process. Analysis would be improved by increasing the flow of talented people into the intelligence community from outside the government. Greater provision should be made for lateral and mid-career entry of such analysts as well as for their short-term involvement in specific projects. Closer ties between universities and the intelligence community is desirable in this regard. Careerists would benefit from greater opportunities to spend time in other departments and non-governmental organizations, including those involved in commerce and finance.
The most important function for the clandestine services is the collection of human intelligence, that is, espionage. Such intelligence can complement other sources and, especially in closed societies, be the principal or sole source of information. In so doing, it will at times prove necessary to associate the United States with unsavory individuals, including some who have committed crimes. This is acceptable so long as the likelybenefits for policy outweigh the moral and political costs of the association.
The capability to undertake covert action is an important national security tool, one that can provide policymakers a valuable alternative or complement to other policies, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention. Building a capacity for both espionage and covert action takes time and resources; nurturing such a clandestine capability ought to be one of the highest priorities of the intelligence community. Constraints on clandestine activity need to be reviewed periodically to ensure that they do not unduly limit the effectiveness of this tool.
[The writer represented the National Association of Chiefs of Police on a Government Accounting Office panel studying the restructuring of the FBI.]
